Reconstructing democracy: current thinking and new directions by Saward, Michael
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Reconstructing democracy: current thinking and new
directions
Journal Item
How to cite:
Saward, Michael (2001). Reconstructing democracy: current thinking and new directions. Government and
Opposition, 36(4) pp. 559–581.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: [not recorded]
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/1477-7053.00081
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
559RECONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY
Michael Saward
Reconstructing Democracy: Current
Thinking and New Directions
TODAY’S DEMOCRATIC THEORY OFFERS SKETCHES OF TOMORROW’S
democratic polity. How innovative, and how compelling, are the
visions it offers us? This article explores possible democratic futures
by scanning a selection of today’s key democratic innovations —
cosmopolitan, deliberative, ‘politics of presence’, ecological, associative and
party-based direct models — in the light of a set of six central issues
useful for examining the core aspects of democratic theories. It
concludes by suggesting a way forward in which insights from diverse
innovations might helpfully be accommodated within an overarching
framework. Overall, it represents a deliberate attempt at a bird’s
eye view of the subject; the aim is to be suggestive rather than
definitive. The scope of the analysis is broad but quite strictly
qualified in the following ways: the six innovative ideas scrutinized
arise from, and largely address, countries of the rich North rather
than the developing South; they do not exhaust the range of current
innovations in democratic theory; and they are based largely on
English-language sources.
A convincing yardstick is needed if we are to call any idea ‘new’
or ‘innovative’ (even accepting that much that passes for new is a
repackaging of something much older). I suggest that any theory of
democracy will offer answers to certain key questions (which, for
ease of reference, are designated ‘A-F’, below and subsequently).
A — how ought the political unit and political community in which
democracy is to be practised be understood, in terms of geography,
population size, the terms of membership (or citizenship) and degree
of cultural homogeneity?
B — what constitutional constraints should democratic majorities
face, if any? What rights, if any, should be guaranteed to members
or citizens of a democracy?
C — to what degree and over what concerns should distinct sub-
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groups, functional or territorial, possess rights to autonomy or
collective self-determination?
D — what is to be the balance between different forms of popular
participation in the making of collective decisions, in terms of both
(a) the balance between direct and representative institutions, and
(b) the balance of variation within each of these two basic forms?
E — how are relations of accountability to be structured, how are
‘accounts’ to be given, by whom and to whom?
F — how are the respective roles of the public and the private spheres,
and formal and informal modes of political activity, to be
understood, and which is taken to provide what in terms of the
requirements of a healthy democratic structure?
Together, these six questions make up the dimensions along which
different visions of democracy vary; they represent a set of issues
on which any self-respecting purveyor of a model or theory of
democracy will take a position. Would-be innovative theories may,
for example, shift emphases within a dimension, downgrade the
importance of any one dimension and highlight the importance of
others, or fundamentally reinterpret how a given dimension ought
to be understood. Shortly we shall see instances of all three strategies.
Of course, responses to these core issues historically have varied
enormously. Nevertheless, certain lines of liberal democratic
orthodoxy are reasonably clear — even if the idea of a ‘traditional
response’ denotes a field of dispute rather than an uncontested fact.
We can say, without doing too much violence to a highly complex
subject, that modern democratic theory has been characterized by
the advocacy or acceptance of primarily representative institutions
[D]. Allied to this, politics and therefore democracy has been
conceived as occurring largely within the formal structure of the state
[F]. The formal range of the jurisdiction of that state has been
defined in terms of national territorial units [A] on the basis of
majority rule [B] constrained largely by guaranteed rights to
expressive, associative and basic political freedoms only. Elected and
appointed officials exercise considerable policy discretion in the
context of lines of formal and hierarchical accountability [E]. Distinct
territorial sub-groups would have tightly circumscribed autonomy (if
any) from the central state within a specific scope [C]. Procrustean
as this view may be, I would argue that it offers a defensible sketch
of the default mode for twentieth-century democratic theory. I put
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it forward as a baseline for considering my main focus — the key
democratic innovations for the new century.
NEW DIRECTIONS
A proper critique of the theories discussed below clearly would
require much more space than is available here. I confine myself to
brief indications of how and where the key innovations arise.
Cosmopolitan Democracy. David Held1 inf luentially contends that
the future health of democracy depends upon the entrenchment
and defence of a common set of democratic rights and obligations
at local, national, regional and global levels, with no privileged
sovereign level, and with an eye to deepening the capacity of people
affected by decisions and actions which increasingly escape nation-
state control to have a say in them. The rights concerned — based
on the principle of autonomy — range from civil and political
through to cultural and reproductive rights. In institutional terms,
Held envisages effective new courts and parliaments operating at
regional and global levels, entrenching and enacting these rights
and opportunities as part of a ‘common structure of political action’.
The issues Held addresses are both basic and complex. For
political or economic developments which have a significant impact
on populations across a number of countries, how can democratic
consent — and with it democratic legitimacy — be attained without
a democratically constituted supranational political entity? How can
the ‘democratic deficit’ of virtually all international political
institutions be addressed effectively if not by extending and adapting
democratic rights, principles and institutions to levels of governance
beyond the national?
Held innovates along dimensions [A] and [B] in particular. With
respect to the issue of political community, cosmopolitans argue
that democracy ought not to be understood primarily as being
applicable above all to nation-states, but also and equally at other
levels from the local to the global. With regard to majority rule and
citizen rights, democratic majorities at any level must be constrained
from transgressing a wide array of autonomy rights. The
1 D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995; D. Held,
‘The Transformation of Political Community’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon
(eds), Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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(underdeveloped) cosmopolitan view of nested layers of legislatures
and courts from the local to the global also offers a distinctive
perspective on federalism (Held writes of his cosmopolitan model
as involving something ‘between the principles of federalism and
confederalism’2) — liberating these concepts from applicability to
solely national contexts (where sub-groups are sub-national groups)
and so outlining a case for this model being innovative with regard
to our dimension [C] as well.
How compelling are these cosmopolitan breaks with the ‘default
mode’? Even setting aside disputes over the nature and extent of
‘globalization’, some question whether democratic citizenship can
ever operate in any conventional way above the national level.3 Others
go further, such as Robert A. Dahl who argues that ‘an international
organization is not and probably cannot be a democracy’.4 According
to Dahl, if we consider that: international organizations and processes
operate on such a scale; with such remoteness from ordinary people’s
lives; with respect to issues whose complexity evades the vast majority;
and in a context where the diversity of peoples and nations makes
common interests elusive at best, then we can only conclude that
cosmopolitan models tend to be over-optimistic.
There are also issues arising from the sheer range of rights which
Held argues ought to be constitutionalized (or taken out of major-
itarian hands). It is true that there is no inherent tension between
democracy and constitutionalism. But if the set of democratic rights
extends far beyond familiar civil and political rights we can find
ourselves on a slippery slope where the courts must resolve issues
that arguably belong in the realm of ‘normal’ democratic politics.
In short, the cosmopolitan model appears to shift the balance
between constitutionalism and democracy in favour of the former.
In addition, some of the specif ic rights Held proposes for
constitutionalization might prove to be especially controversial, such
as suggested rights to ‘control over fertility’ and to a ‘guaranteed
minimum income’. Although Held argues that such rights ought to
2 Ibid., p. 230.
3 W. Kymlicka, ‘Citizenship in an Era of Globalization: Commentary on Held’, in
I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1999; A. Wendt, ‘A Comment on Held’s Cosmopolitanism’, in I.
Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy’s Edges.
4 R. A. Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View’,
in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy’s Edges, p. 19.
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be enacted in ways that are ‘sensitive to the traditions, values and
levels of development of particular societies’,5 there appears to be
some slippage between the need for a ‘common structure of political
action’ (built on common rights) and any particular common
structure. Arguably, a common structure of action on a regional or
global scale would (a) need to be ‘thinner’ or more minimalist than
Held appears to suggest, and (b) concerned more with procedures
and less with substance.
Often enough, disputes within one of democracy’s key dimensions
spill over into disputes about others, or about their relative
importance. Dryzek6 argues that Held’s four nested layers of political
units, with their array of familiar governmental institutions and
overlapping jurisdictions, are less than adequate in that they replicate
conventional nation-state models — formal government of continuous
territorial units within specific physical borders. In his view, state-
like structures are too inf lexible; transnational democratization must
depend more on transnational civil society (in part addressing issues
in dimension [A] by subordinating them to issues in dimension
[F]). For Dryzek, ‘discursive democracy’ — a variant of deliberative
democracy, to be discussed below — in informal or non-state cross-
border networks represents the future of democratization in the
transnational sphere. Dennis Thompson is likewise critical of Held’s
model, partly for the ways in which he thinks its dispersal of political
authority will render accountability more elusive and complex (a
point of relevance to dimension [E]), but also because it does not
take sufficient account of the idea of deliberative democracy. It is
difficult to know how to organize cross-border votes; it is easier
(arguably) to organize cross-border talk or deliberation on issues
of mutual concern. Thompson thinks international accountability
and decision-making can be enhanced if for instance ‘a state could
establish forums in which representatives could speak for the
ordinary citizens of foreign states, presenting their claims and
responding to counter-claims of representatives of the host state’ —
‘a kind of Tribune for non-citizens’.7
5 D. Held, Democracy and Global Order, p. 201.
6 J. S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2000.
7 D. Thompson, ‘Democratic Theory and Global Society’, Journal of Political
Philosophy, 7 (1999). Held does advocate the use of deliberative forums as part of his
model; we are dealing here with matters of emphasis.
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We can glimpse how the cosmopolitan model has begun to shift
the focus of political theory on dimension [A] especially. Its critics
largely accept that the problems it seeks to address are real ones. At
the same time, one does not have to accept a strong version of the
globalization thesis to see cosmopolitan democracy as a compelling
vision. It is difficult to envisage transnational democratic forms
not continuing to develop, however haltingly, or to see the
motivations behind cosmopolitan models subsiding. But perhaps
the type of democracy that evolves in this context will be something
produced from a different mould from the one Held suggests —
transforming our ideas of what counts as ‘democracy’ along the
way. If, for example, Dahl and Hirst8 are right to be sceptical about
whether democracy in any conventional sense can work at that level,
then perhaps democracy will (have to) mean forms of reason-giving
accountability rather than constituencies voting; official-to-official
and official-to-group accountability rather than representative-to-
electorate.
Deliberative Democracy. The deliberative model of democracy has
been the dominant new strand in democratic theory over the past
ten to fifteen years. It has had, and is likely to continue to have, a
great impact on how we think about the various dimensions of
democracy — perhaps most notably on the question of accountability
[E]. This model arose (variously) out of concern that dominant
‘aggregative’ conceptions of democracy, which focus on voting and
elections — essentially, counting heads — were deeply inadequate.
Instead, democracy must involve discussion on an equal and inclusive
basis which operates so as to deepen participant knowledge of issues,
awareness of the interests of others, and the confidence to play an
active part in public affairs. Deliberative democracy looks to
transform people’s (possibly ill-informed) preferences and attitudes
through open and inclusive discussion in which participants are
accorded equal respect; in this sense, it seeks to go beyond the ‘mere’
design of mechanisms to register the preferences that people already
have.
There are markedly different conceptions of deliberative
democracy. Theorists and commentators differ, for example, over:
who should do the deliberating; the extent to which certain standards
8 R. A. Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations be Democratic?’; P. Hirst, ‘Demo-
cracy and Governance’, in J. Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance, Oxford University Press,
2000.
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of ‘rationality’ should govern discourses; the collective goal of
deliberation (consensus, truth, working agreement?); the individual
goal (enlightenment, confidence, empowerment?); and the appro-
priate siting of deliberative forums (courts, parliaments, specially
designed citizens’ forums, political parties, local communities,
among the oppressed, in social movements, within the state, against
the state, within national boundaries, across national boundaries?)
— to name but five important issues.9 A reasonable stab at a common
definition is that of Bohman: ‘Deliberative democracy, broadly
defined, is . . . any one of a family of views according to which the
public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate
political decision making and self-government’.10
Deliberative democracy’s impact on our understanding of most
of the dimensions of democracy has been significant. As we have
seen, some versions, notably Dryzek’s ‘discursive democracy’, have
reinforced the prospect of democracy operating across physical
borders [A] — perhaps across cultural borders as well, laying stress
on procedural means by which heterogeneous groups may be able
to cooperate through open-ended and inclusive processes built
around properly facilitated discussion of agendas and options [C].
The issue of constitutionalism versus majoritarianism [B] is given
a distinctive spin by the deliberative conception — a spin that is
likely to prove inf luential. Deliberationists generally take the view
that constitutional rights cannot be taken for granted as having
universal status and applicability, or general justification; they must
instead be justified deliberatively themselves, and to that extent they
remain provisional.11 At the same time, deliberationists have prob-
9 Between them, the following key texts discuss these major points of division: S.
Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in S. Benhabib
(ed.), Democracy and Difference, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996; J.
Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds),
The Good Polity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989; J. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, New
Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1991; A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy
and Disagreement, Cambridge, Mass. and London, Belknap Press, 1996; J. Rawls,
Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.
10 J. Bohman, ‘The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy’, Journal of Political
Philosophy, 6, p. 401.
11 This view is defended most prominently in A. Gutmann and D. Thompson,
‘Democratic Disagreement’, in S. Macedo (ed.), Deliberative Politics, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1999, pp. 276–7 especially.
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lematized the very notion of a ‘majority’; there is nothing especially
worthy, in democratic terms, they argue, about an aggregate majority
of views which simply ref lects popular ignorance or prejudice on
the issue at hand. If the conventional question has been ‘what
constitutional constraints should democratic majorities face?’, then
the new deliberative version suggests replacing ‘constitutional’ with
‘deliberative’, and leaving the status of the constraints open to
deliberative revision.
In one sense, the deliberative conception downgrades the
importance of the direct versus representative debate in democratic
theory [D] — each is less than adequate to democratic purposes if it
fails to be sufficiently deliberative as well. All adult citizens may
have an equal vote, but will their voice have equal weight in demo-
cratic deliberation? Can inclusiveness in this larger sense be
achieved? Will the model deliberative forum be like a university
seminar, following (sometimes, at any rate) certain canons of rational
debate, appropriate evidence and so forth? If so, it may be exclusive
because those notions of what counts as rational discourse differ
from one group to another.12 The results may, in the event, be rapidly
overrun by the irrationalities of normal, competitive politics.13 Can
key deliberative arenas be f lexible and inclusive enough to embrace
cultural difference in highly pluralistic post-modern societies?
Deliberative conceptions have transformed our view of account-
ability [E]. Rather than expressing a property of a line-hierarchy —
e.g., the civil servant is accountable to the minister, the minister to
parliament, parliament to the people — deliberative democracy
places renewed stress on accountability as the ongoing giving of
accounts, explanations or reasons to those subject to decisions. As
such it prompts us to reinterpret such subjects as freedom of
information, the accessibility of parliamentary procedure, and the
role of broadcasting and the internet in fostering links between
representatives and constituencies. Further, it renders much more
f lexible our notions of who must give accounts to whom (e.g. non-
elected off icials can be held to various forms of deliberative
accountability).
12 I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000,
pp. 52–80 especially.
13 I. Budge, ‘Deliberative Democracy Versus Direct Democracy — Plus Political
Parties!’, in M. Saward (ed.), Democratic Innovation, London, Routledge, 2000.
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With regard to the sixth dimension [F], deliberative democracy
especially in its Habermasian versions14 has emphasized the
importance of a f luid, dynamic process of ‘opinion-formation’ in
the non-state public sphere; some who are inf luenced by Habermas
now seek to go beyond his latest framework to underline even further
the greater scope that exists for authentic democratic action outside
the constricting formal boundaries of formal state structures — the
essence of Dryzek’s ‘discursive’ model.
In these respects, deliberative conceptions have not so much
shifted our perspectives within the six dimensions as demanded that
we rethink what we mean by them. The meanings of political com-
munity, of democratic constraint, of giving an account of actions,
of participation in the public sphere, have been profoundly affected
by the deliberative turn in democratic theory. Important questions
remain, however. For example, deliberative democrats will be pressed
to decide who is to do the deliberating, and where, and with what
links to other decision-making institutions. Continuing practical
experiments in the USA, Australia and various West European
countries with deliberative opinion polls and citizen juries provide
one sort of response to the ‘who’ and ‘where’ questions from within
deliberative theory;15 but there are other ways that offer sometimes
radically different responses — not least in the following democratic
innovations. I turn to some of these now.
The Politics of Presence (and ‘Difference’). Advocates of a ‘politics
of presence’ (and the related ‘politics of difference’), like deliberative
democrats, are critical of how liberal democracy has traditionally
viewed democratic citizens as fundamentally the same as each other:
a citizen is someone with rights and obligations by virtue of
membership of the state. No particular characteristics, sexual, ethnic,
linguistic, cultural or religious, attach to the category of citizen.
Feminist and multicultural critics have challenged this apparently
neutral view of citizenship, arguing that it masks processes of social
and cultural exclusion and inequality by in turn masking differences
that are highly relevant to a more sophisticated view of equal
treatment.
14 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996.
15 J. S. Fishkin and R. C. Luskin, ‘The Quest for ‘Deliberative Democracy’, in M.
Saward (ed.), Democratic Innovation, London, Routledge, 2000; G. Smith, ‘Toward
Deliberative Institutions’, in M. Saward (ed.), Democratic Innovation.
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For Phillips,16 a key response to the relative exclusion of (for
example) women and ethnic minorities from formal political
institutions (such as representative parliaments) in many Western
democracies is to supplement ‘the politics of ideas’ with ‘the politics
of presence’. Party and parliamentary politics in the familiar sense,
she argues, are about what representatives do rather than who they
are; about the ideas (or policies or ideologies) which they press for
rather than their gender, race, religion etc. It is no longer enough,
in her view, to lay much greater stress on representing ideas; instead,
we should elevate the importance of addressing ‘the inclusion of
previously excluded voices’ by promoting a politics of presence.17
Parliaments should have a gender, ethnic (and so forth) composition
that broadly ref lects the population at large. Even if more women
and black MPs, for example, do not necessarily represent some
mythically essentialist view of ‘women’s’ or ‘black’ interests, repre-
sentation, like justice, needs to be seen to be done, as well as to be
done.18
If Phillips’s approach is basically reformist — supporting practical
changes that would heighten the presence of previously relatively
excluded voices from representative legislatures — that of Iris Young
has been more radical (and perhaps more difficult to pin down).
Young has stressed the importance of forms of deliberative
democracy which take fully on board group difference — indeed
she has called her preferred conception ‘communicative democracy’
and said that this alternative model goes ‘beyond deliberative
democracy’.19 Where Phillips is wary of strong guarantees of
representation for (e.g.) women in legislatures, Young argues that
‘commitment to political equality entails that democratic institutions
and practices take measures explicitly to include the representation
of social groups whose perspectives would likely be excluded from
expression in discussion without those measures’.20 Her earlier work
involved demands that a certain number of seats in the legislature
be reserved for members of marginalized groups. She has moved
16 A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
17 Ibid., p. 10.
18 Ibid., p. 82.
19 I. M. Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’,
in S. Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press, 1996.
20 I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 148.
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from this position, favouring the principle but being more f lexible
about the means of achieving it — forms of proportional representa-
tion in multi-member constituencies, for example, would avoid
tendencies to ‘freeze’ the characters of groups into false essences.21
‘Difference’ and ‘presence’ theories challenge democratic
orthodoxy across the six dimensions, in ways that variously reinforce
and diverge from cosmopolitan and deliberative critiques. They
stress the ways in which populations of contemporary Western states,
at least, are highly differentiated and varied in cultural and other
ways; social and cultural pluralism, not homogeneity, is the challenge
that models of democracy must confront [A]. On the second
dimension [B], some difference theory logic would add group rights,
perhaps even group vetoes, to the ‘list’ of constitutional limits on
what democratic majorities may do. That is a controversial move:
individualism and individual rights have been powerful underpin-
nings for the idea of democracy throughout the modern period,
notwithstanding the importance of groups (such as trade unions)
in f ighting for the achievement and deepening of democracy,
historically. But perhaps democracy today does demand radical
redress for interests long marginalized, and the strength of that
demand which lies in the principle of equality, may lend it
democratic credibility despite its anti-majoritarian character.
Ideas about rethinking representation among ‘difference’
democrats have a clear impact upon the shift in emphasis from
territorial/federal forms of sub-group autonomy to ‘identity’ groups
[C]; curiously, too, they shore up representative rather than direct
forms of democracy by (as these theorists see it) adapting the
concept of ‘representation’ itself [D]. With regard to accountability
[E], they press us to make a double adaptation of democratic ortho-
doxy. First, the deliberative approach of emphasizing accountability
as the continuous giving of reasons rather than the existence of
formal, hierarchical lines of answerability is adopted; and secondly,
this process is deepened by adding the idea of intra-group
accountability whereby (for instance) black representatives may be
required to justify their actions to black constituencies within a larger
system of group representation. By the same token, these approaches
21 Ibid., pp. 148–53; see also discussion in J. Squires, ‘Group Representation,
Deliberation, and the Displacement of Dichotomies’, in M. Saward (ed.), Democratic
Innovation.
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could be said to offer ways in which key divisions and social
inequalities in civil society may be addressed by revising democratic
structures in the state [F].
For a mid-range theory, the ‘politics of presence’ highlights
pressing challenges to democratic orthodoxy in diverse,
multicultural, multifaith societies, like France, the UK and the USA.
Controversy attends ways in which political representation might
need to be reshaped to ref lect the demands of ‘presence’. One can
expect institutional innovations here to continue, by necessity.
Ecological Redefinitions. Like ‘difference’ approaches perhaps,
political ecologists do not offer a three-dimensional model of
democracy, but rather an orientation towards, and a set of focused
criticisms of, democratic orthodoxies. Many of these criticisms
resonate with cosmopolitan and deliberative concerns.
Green political theorists, like greens in general, have been highly
critical of the idea and practice of representative democracy as we
know it. Early waves of green political theorizing featured calls for
more direct democracy, radical decentralization of political
authority to local communities, radical grassroots party organi-
zation, and small, rural, face-to-face assemblies on the Athenian
model.22 Since the early 1980s, though, green political theory has
had a more nuanced relationship with democratic norms and prac-
tices. Today, the ecological stress is on adapting, renovating, and
deepening democracy rather than replacing it, rendering it fair and
inclusive with respect to non-human interests as well — moving it
beyond ‘human chauvinism’. Thus, innovation along some of our
dimensions of democracy has been a high priority for political
ecologists. In particular, this has involved rethinking democratic
procedures, in line with concern about green attachment to democracy
as expressed by Goodin: ‘To advocate democracy is to advocate
procedures, to advocate environmentalism is to advocate substantive
outcomes: what guarantee can we have that the former procedures
will yield the latter sorts of outcomes?’23
Key ecological emphases arise with respect to dimension [F] —
state or civil society? Suspicious of the extent to which states are
22 See for example: M. Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, Palo Alto, Cheshire Books,
1982; A. Carter, ‘Towards a Green Political Theory’, in A. Dobson and P. Lucardie
(eds), The Politics of Nature, London, Routledge, 1993; J. Porritt, Seeing Green, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1984; K. Sale, Dwellers in the Land, San Francisco, Sierra Club, 1985.
23 R. E. Goodin, Green Political Theory, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, p. 168.
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locked into ecologically unsustainable economic, military and
developmental imperatives, Dryzek favours models of democrati-
zation which are more oriented towards and active within civil
society; the suggestion here is that democratization (in the West at
any rate) has probably gone as far as it can in the formal structures
of the state; further democratization (and progress on environ-
mental issues) can and must take place within civil society instead.
His examples of such action centre on networks of non-state
organizations across national boundaries targeting, for example,
‘biopiracy’ in South American rainforests.24
With respect to dimension [B], greens have agreed that demo-
cracy must be regarded as a self-binding concept, and have then
given this a distinctive ecological spin. If majorities must be limited
in certain ways for a system to be a genuine democracy, then why
can ecological limits not be part of a package of constitutional
provisions constraining democratic governments? Conceived as a
necessary condition for a thriving democratic community, why
should not freedom from environmental harm or degradation be
analogous to freedom of expression (for example) in the pantheon
of democratic thought?25
Further, it has been proposed that, in a way reminiscent of views
expressed within the ‘politics of presence’ idea, familiar repre-
sentative institutions can and should be adapted so that the vital
interests of (in particular) non-human nature and future generations
can find a ‘voice’. This could work, for example, by the proxy repre-
sentation of nature: interested constituencies (such as memberships
of campaigning environmental groups) could elect members of
parliament whose task is to represent non-human nature, on the
grounds that, since democracy is all about representing the interests
of the affected, it would be unjust to exclude and thus to discriminate
against non-human interests of the natural world.26 Clearly this idea
reinforces the institution of representation and the importance of
representative democracy [D] by remoulding it. Prior to that —
indeed, as a condition of it — fundamental interpretations of what
24 J. S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond.
25 R. Eckersley, ‘Greening Liberal Democracy’, in B. Doherty and M. de Geus (eds),
Democracy and Green Political Thought, London, Routledge, 1996.
26 A. Dobson, ‘Representative Democracy and the Environment’, in W. Lafferty
and J. Meadowcroft (eds), Democracy and the Environment, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar,
1996.
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it takes to be a member of a political community are being chal-
lenged head-on (a key aspect of dimension [A]). The idea of new,
and multiple, communities-of-fate is important here. Environmental
circumstances link the destinies of people, animals, and the rest of
non-human nature in fateful/inescapable spaces. Boundaries for
democracy thus defined are f luid, shifting and unpredictable rather
than fixed and securely known over time. And related to this, the
meaning and potentialities of accountability [E] are radically broad-
ened in political ecological thinking. Accountability to the interests
of non-human nature, accountability across the generations, con-
stitutional accountability for the specific circumstances of com-
munity thriving — in these and other senses, accountability, like
representation, comes under renewed questioning by green
democratic theorists.
Many of these would-be innovations are linked by green theorists
to the ubiquitous deliberative current in democratic thought.
According to Eckersley, deliberative approaches can foster a long-
term view, and prompt deliberators to hear expressions of, and
ideally to take on board, others’ (including nature’s) interests. It is
vital, though, to link representative innovations to deliberation by
insisting on the inclusion of the marginalized via a (virtual) version
of a ‘politics of presence’. Perhaps the most challenging point here
is how democratically to include non-human interests in parlia-
mentary and bureaucratic policy-making procedures. Eckersley, for
example, advocates a number of innovative mechanisms, including
an ‘Environmental Defenders Office’ and constitutional entrench-
ment of the ‘precautionary principle’, which guards against actions
which may carry considerable ecological risks.27 Clearly this complex
vision of an ecological democracy calls for innovations across the
range of democracy’s core dimensions. Some of these innovations
involve adapting the familiar — legal rights, for example. Others,
like proxy representation for nature, have a more utopian look. But
for how long? In twenty years, given the recent pace of the develop-
ment of environmental consciousness and awareness, it ought to be
no great surprise if the unthinkable has become thinkable — and
even seen as necessary.
27 R. Eckersley, ‘Deliberative Democracy, Ecological Representation and Risk:
Towards a Democracy of the Affected’, in M. Saward (ed.), Democratic Innovation.
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Associative Democracy. Visions of associative democracy, most
notably in the work of Hirst and Cohen and Rogers,28 continue to
be highly inf luential among political theorists and policy-makers
looking for new, diverse and f lexible ways to make and deliver
policies in the wake of a broad loss of confidence in, and political
and philosophical support for, the traditional top-down model of
the welfare state. Proponents of ideas of associative democracy look
to move beyond the individualist-statist divide (in theory and in
practice) to make voluntary groups or associations the focal point
for the citizen’s participation in, and engagement with, his or her
community. As such, they stress new forms of responsibility and
accountability at the local level, reducing the role of the central
state. Associationalists seek a ‘dispersed, decentralized democracy’
which ‘combines the individual choice of liberalism with the public
provision of collectivism’.29
In Hirst’s associative democracy, which I take as the baseline,
the existing structures of liberal democracy would be supplemented
(and in some cases replaced) by a range of new institutions, mostly
local associations such as religious and cultural organizations,
interest groups and trade unions. Publicly funded according to a
formula ref lecting the quality, coverage and character of their
provisions, these associations would take over much of the delivery
— and up to a point also the devising — of welfare services. In
principle, citizens would be free to opt in and out of associations
(and their services) as they wish. The context for this decentralized,
pluralistic associationalism would be an economy which has a much
more local and regional focus and in which small and medium-sized
firms would take on an array of public functions, perhaps most
crucially welfare service delivery. In this vision, the role of the state
would change quite dramatically, from a provider to an enabler or
facilitator of services as well as a standard-setter for more
decentralized systems.30
28 J. Cohen and J. Rogers, ‘Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance’,
Politics and Society, 20 (1992), pp. 393–472; P. Hirst, Associative Democracy, Cambridge,
Polity Press, 1994; P. Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism, London, UCL Press, 1997.
29 P. Hirst, Associative Democracy, pp. 189; 22.
30 The associational vision of Cohen and Rogers ref lects the structure and concerns
of Hirst’s in many ways, but is oriented more towards top-down state fostering of appro-
priate associations for making public decisions and delivering public services, whereas
Hirst’s vision involves considerably more genuine decentralization and localism.
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Associative visions offer innovations on a number of the core
dimensions of democracy. While the nation-state as the territorial
basis of a democratic community is not questioned in any substantial
way within this model [A], clearly the role and status of democratic
majoritarianism is [B]. Here, the restrictions on democratic
majorities are not couched in terms of constitutional rights, but
rather in terms of a radical decentralization of political power such
that central government majorities can have little impact on on-the-
ground political change. So, the associative model encourages us
to remodel our basic interpretations of dimension [B]. It ought no
longer to be conceived as a continuum from majoritarianism to
constitutionalism. Instead, it raises questions about the nature and
extent of central government’s legitimate role vis-à-vis local associ-
ative provision. Associationalists and their critics debate whether
traditional majoritarianism might be bypassed entirely, in favour of
the local community and a group-centred system of regulation and
decision-making — reminding us in the process that it is the indi-
vidualistic basis of democratic theory that makes majoritarianism
a central category, and that that basis is in the end optional. Strong
forms of association or group-based pluralism can contribute to
paradigms in which (a) the very idea of majority rule makes little
sense, but (b) the depth of democratic choice and welfare is,
arguably, increased.31
Associative democracy clearly envisages a significant shift in focus
from territorial to functional sub-groups (dimension C), though the
confederal vision favoured by Hirst combines territorial and
functional modes of representation. It is not clear how a working
associative order would resolve inevitable tensions between the
claims to legitimacy and domains of activity (such as general
standard-setting for service delivery) represented by institutions
based on these two modes respectively.
With respect to the representative-direct divide [D], associative
democracy adopts and radically modifies elements of both in a new
structure of representation and participation. The ‘direct’ element
31 Hirst writes that: ‘Majority decisions matter but they have a subsiding part
to play in the process of governance. Elections and referenda are relatively infre-
quent and only decide certain salient issues, whereas governance is a continuous process
and all of its decisions cannot be subject to majority approval’. P. Hirst, ‘Democracy
and Governance’, in J. Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2000, p. 27.
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is not (primarily, at any rate) exercised through voting, but rather
participation in and through associational life of regions and
localities. ‘Representation’ goes beyond the traditional electoral-
constituency basis; one’s needs are represented through the
associations which gain or lose materially according to how well
they are perceived to serve the relevant interests. Similarly, demo-
cratic accountability takes on a different meaning [E], involving the
accountability of local associations both to their members and
recipients of their local services, and to central government with
respect to maintaining minimum standards for service-delivery.
Significant emphasis is placed upon self-determination at the local
level in civil society as an alternative to state provision and deter-
mination of services (dimension F) — activating the participative
potential of civil society is close to the heart of associative visions.
In short, on various dimensions, the associative model rethinks the
meanings of basic democratic concepts and practices.
Direct Democracy. Finally, we turn to the oldest innovation in
democratic thought — direct democracy. The main recent innovation
in this area, in terms of its impact on theory and practice, is the
‘party-based’ model explained and advocated by Budge.32 Each of
the innovations considered so far has elements which shade into
the territory of direct democracy. The local orientation of associative
democracy and many ecological visions has a ‘direct’ quality; this is
true of deliberative forums too, insofar as ordinary citizens are free
to participate. Even Held writes of the need for cross-border
referendums as part of the cosmopolitan model. Once again, the
categories we are working with are not watertight.
Budge offers the idea of a party-based direct democracy. As he
sees it, such a system involves ‘the people’ in effect becoming an
additional house of a national legislature. Major policy proposals,
or bills, passed in the representative legislature would go to a national
referendum vote. Propositions would become law only if they passed
this test, according to criteria which may include thresholds (or super-
majorities) rather than simple majority rule. In this system, political
parties would continue to run candidates for elective public offices,
form governments, propose legislation, and so forth. In Budge’s
schema, however, they would in addition campaign for their
preferred outcomes in regular policy referendums.
32 I. Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996.
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Budge is keen to avoid the problems of what he calls ‘unmediated’
direct democracy — easily dismissed as utopian or unworkable by
direct democracy’s critics — in which representative or secondary
institutions like parliaments, parties and even governments are
assumed not to be necessary. Any serious vision of direct democracy
today must see it as operating alongside, or more clearly as part of, a
larger democratic system which includes (for example) elected
parliaments and political parties. It is here that we can see the major
contribution to democratic reconstruction of this model — the
effective collapsing of any simple and strong distinction between direct
and representative democracy, and within that the assertion of new,
practical conceptions of direct democracy which challenge the
widespread perception that it is unworkable in modern conditions.
In the party-based vision, direct forms of policy accountability
via the referendum [E] become much more feasible and desirable
since people are now much better educated, and can make sensible
choices on policies (especially if still guided by parties).
Developments in technology facilitate debate and decision-making
capacity for citizens. The suggestion is that higher levels of citizen
education, along with widespread access to and capacity to use
relevant information, both justify and make practical the view that
important government proposals should be put to the people in
referendums before becoming law.
One could conjecture that the direct–representative distinction
will indeed be, and come to be seen to be, less important in advanced
states in the future. This in part ref lects the fact that direct demo-
cracy requires indirect (representative, administrative, facilitative)
institutions for its realistic functioning,33 such that pressures to
increase the scope for direct decision-making will reinforce
appropriate indirect structures. One might add in addition that the
emphasis on talk, discussion and deliberation is likely to continue
to reduce the significance of hard-and-fast representative–direct
distinctions — though the importance of voting and elections
generally will remain.34
33 This view is elaborated in M. Saward, The Terms of Democracy, Cambridge, Polity
Press, 1998, part 2 especially.
34 See the critiques of deliberative democracy along these lines offered by M.
Saward, ‘Less Than Meets the Eye: Democratic Legitimacy and Deliberative Theory’,
and I. Budge, ‘Deliberative Democracy Versus Direct Democracy — Plus Political
Parties!’, in M. Saward (ed.), Democratic Innovation.
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FROM HERE TO WHERE?
The innovative theories examined brief ly above have variously over-
lapped and diverged in their core concerns and major recommenda-
tions, providing a complex and dynamic picture of potential demo-
cratic futures. That is to be expected; whatever else it represents, that
complexity epitomises the richness of thinking about democracy as
democratic theory passes through its current creative phase.
To attempt anything like a comprehensive summary would be
foolish. Much less than that, I want to outline very brief ly an over-
arching framework within which important connections can be made
across diverse innovative ideas. Although, as we have seen, some
innovative ideas call upon insights from neighbouring literatures —
the ecological drawing on the deliberative, for example — the larger
sense is of separate arguments and models going their separate
theoretical ways. My view is that an expansive and f lexible notion
of democratic procedure can creatively encompass diverse insights,
and in the process show us democratic possibilities that (e.g.)
deliberative or ecological models cannot show us on their own.
To a significant extent, the core concerns of most of the innovative
ideas discussed crystallize in the particular political devices that
they advocate — for cosmopolitans, new supranational confederal
arrangements; for deliberative democrats, for example, specific
deliberative forums such as deliberative polls; advocates of a ‘politics
of presence’ support (e.g.) guaranteed representation for specific
groups; political ecologists advocate (e.g.) proxy representation and
special environmental defence institutions; associative democrats
favour decision-making by local associations; and direct democrats
advocate the use of the initiative and referendum devices. In each
case, these devices are allied to other, more familiar ones, like elected
legislatures and constitutions conferring civil and political rights.
Further, both singly and together, devices enact principles: variously
autonomy, political equality, inclusion, the common interest,
participation.35 In this sense, we can say that principles are primarily
35 Or more precisely, they enact one of a number of reasonable interpretations of a
principle or principles. Neither devices nor principles can be given a single, correct,
properly ‘democratic’ meaning; their lack of fixed meaning is intrinsic to them. What
fixed meaning they have, in given times and places, comes from their relationship to
each other as it develops in theoretical and public debate, and not to some reference
point or arbiter external to that relationship in that context.
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things that we do, rather than rights or statuses that are conferred.36
A deliberative poll, for example, enacts one sense of the principle
of political equality; a policy referendum presents a quite different
sense of the same principle. Including both of these devices in a
real decision procedure would represent an effort to enact in one
procedure different dimensions of political equality and inclusion,
for example.
This is a key point. Viewing a democratic procedure as a sequence
of devices, deployed so as to evoke certain principles and to provoke
certain motivations in different groups and individuals, enables us
to make connections across the innovations and the dimensions.
Bringing together procedural devices in new combinations enables
us (in principle) to pool deliberative, cosmopolitan, ecological and
other insights. Various of these insights may be incompatible, of
course, and a certain democratic minimum — crucially, the
protection of basic individual rights — must always be respected.
But without a framework that encourages us to bring diverse
innovations together we will be less likely to pinpoint such possible
tensions.
Adopting this approach to democratic theory — a ref lexive
proceduralism, if you like37 — encourages and enables us to conceive
of sequences of discrete devices in an enriched, complex and f lexible
idea of democratic procedure. Why not citizens’ initiatives to set
the agenda, subsequent deliberative poll and parliamentary
deliberation, followed by parliamentary decision to be endorsed by
popular referendum, as a vision of a single democratic procedure?
My choice of this example is no accident; I have elsewhere put the
case in some detail for the radical supplementing of conventional
representative institutions with direct democratic devices and the
36 Here I draw loosely on Judith Butler’s approach to ‘gender’. Butler writes that
‘. . . the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced . . . gender is always a
doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed . . .
There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is
performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’.
See J. Butler, Gender Trouble, New York and London, Routledge, 1990, pp. 24–5.
37 The approach is distinctively proceduralist in that it is focused on the shaping of
political procedures, and it accepts outcomes as legitimate if they have been produced
by a certain procedure. It is reflexive in that it conceives of democratic principles and
devices adjusting meanings and functions according to information about their own
practice, and changing shape according to their terrain (country, culture).
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institutions required to ensure their adequate functioning,38 and
the deeply f lawed nature of deliberative democrats’ common
dismissal of direct democracy in modern states,39 and so will not
repeat myself here. Note, however, the potential for such a compound
decision-making procedure to provide political elites in particular
with incentives to explain and defend key proposals in public in
ways that (for example) the operation of the UK governmental and
policy system currently does not. Including a referendum require-
ment for major new laws (as in Budge’s recommendations) would
create an incentive for policy advocates to put proposals in accessible
language; including a statistically representative deliberative forum,
prior to legislative consideration and a referendum, might encourage
relatively impartial consideration of how proposals could affect
different groups in society. Picked up from different streams in
democratic theory debates, these devices taken together enact
specific versions of principles of equality, public interest, inclusion
and participation.
Of course I acknowledge the fact that constructing purely
theoretical democratic procedures is little more than an academic
parlour game; the design of real procedures must work within
specif ic political cultures, limited time-frames, fundamental
disagreement and confusion about means and ends, and with the
institutions that exist rather than wholly innovative blueprints.40 At
the same time, we are not entirely incapable of shaping elements of
our political world, using ideas in the first instance. A f lexible
framework that encourages democratic innovation can be an
important ingredient in keeping democratic practice up to date in
the face of tremendous social and technological pressures. Such is
the rich variety of democratic innovations today that we need a
rather abstract, minimalist framework within which we can begin
to see how apparently quite different innovations can be productively
linked. Theories of ‘prefix democracy’ (‘deliberative’, ‘associative’,
38 See Saward, The Terms of Democracy, part II especially, for an extended defence
of this view.
39 See M. Saward, ‘Direct and Deliberative Democracy’, paper delivered at the
conference ‘Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy’, University of Texas at Austin,
February 2000.
40 An excellent account of these and related issues of institutional design can be
found in R. E. Goodin, ‘Institutions and Their Design’, in Goodin (ed.), The Theory of
Institutional Design, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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‘direct’, ‘ecological’) can be too partisan and partial. By renewing
and expanding the idea of a democratic procedure, we can weigh
the rich array of new, alternative conceptions of democratic decision-
making without in principle reducing democracy itself to any one
of its specific institutional possibilities.
Some will find such a proceduralist framework to be lacking
specific recommendations. At one level, that is quite deliberate.
Sometimes in ongoing and complex debates such as those about
the character of democratic systems it is necessary to step back, to
take stock of key assumptions and to think about making connections
between disparate, seemingly separate elements and positions in
the debate. An argument for a new proceduralism in democratic
theory is a second-order argument: not a specific, first-order vision
of what democracy ought to look like, but rather a way of thinking
through and evaluating various such visions. This article started by
noting the multi-sidedness of the current wave of innovation in
democratic theory. Straightforward ‘legislation’ (or stipulation) of
what democracy must mean and how it must be practised is too
blunt an approach. The inherent plurality of meanings of democratic
principles, and the wide variety of devices for their democratic
enactment, will always render such efforts ultimately futile. In line
with this view, I suggest that the most defensible approach to demo-
cratic theorizing today is a form of ‘interpretive reason’ which is
‘engaged in dialogue where legislative reason strives for the right
to soliloquy’.41 A f lexible proceduralism fosters creative inter-
pretation of familiar democratic institutions and processes, as well
as considering how these might adapt to changing environmental
circumstances. It can do so as part of a conversation in which no
single blueprint can rightly be seen as surpassing all other
interpretations.
Further, many will object to ‘proceduralism’, which gets a rather
bad press generally in political theory. Often, this is because it is
wrongly identif ied simply with attachment to the majority rule
device;42 in addition, it is claimed that there can be no independent
standards of political or moral rightness restricting democratic
outcomes. Proceduralism, in this way, looks vulnerable to alternative
41 Z. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, p. 126.
42 This is the case for example in Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and
Disagreement.
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(constitutional, ‘epistemic’, deliberative) views which appear to value
and seek to protect universal rights against ignorant majorities and/
or to add additional public, justificatory processes to the formation
of majorities, such as deliberative forums. It is only so vulnerable,
however, if a narrow and impoverished view of proceduralism is
adopted. A democratic procedure can be complex and creative,
designed to enact the promise of substantive democratic principles,
can consist of multiple, sequenced devices and not just single devices,
can be deliberative as well as aggregative, and so on. It is important
to recognize that proceduralism is not anti-substance. There are
principles in the process — ‘process principles’ if you like — which
make a process democratic in the first place.
The idea of ‘democracy’ has always contained within it the seeds
of its own transformation. Today, what we mean by the concept is
rapidly in the process of becoming more diverse, less symmetrical,
more malleable, more complex. In this sense, we may need to
become relaxed about a new, ‘pick-and-mix’ conception of
procedural democracy. Various devices (such as elected legislatures,
citizens’ deliberative forums, the initiative and referendum) are in
principle available to enact particular understandings of basic
democratic principles of equality, freedom, inclusion, and so on, at
different levels of political community. In the light of these points,
we can say that a more permissive approach to what may count as
‘democracy’ may in turn foster (and endorse) a further period of
fruitful and creative democratic design.
